Today, it is not easy to establish a clear and straight line from the organisation developing during this `implantation’ period to the birth of the EZLN. But what’s for sure is the existence of this link. After a lapse of time other Maoist groups arrived in Chiapas. Marcos himself would have been among one of the last “brigades”. A lot of militants and political leaders disappeared as a result of the merciless repression carried out by the army and mercenaries employed by landowners, as for the survivors,they had to revise some of their conceptions depending on local conditions. Finally, we know that the basic tactics and principles of the leftist Maoists began to reappear in the peasant struggles: the constant resort to assemblies as a means of hiding and protecting the political chiefs.
The Mexican Maoists — like their Peruvian counterparts in The Shining Path -had, in their own way, criticised the Guevarist idea of foco. They had understood that political `implantation’ would be doomed to failure if it were only the result of actions taken by a small group parachuted into very closed Indian communities hostile to all those coming from the outside. From the beginning, they proclaimed the uniqueness of Indian culture, for tactical reasons. The small groups of militants must have integrated themselves into the communities by using, amongst other things, their links with the `indigenous church’. In a second phase, the political organisation adapted its conceptions of leadership to the new historical conditions, characterised by the breakdown of rural communities and by the proletarianisation of Indian peasants. The creation of peasant union organisations was part of this second phase. In 1991 the “Independent Alliance of Emiliano Zapata peasants” transformed itself into a national organisation, an event representing a fundamental political leap. The work of creating a `mass base’ was then accomplished and the `regionalist’ conceptions — claimed by the self-sufficient Indian communities and defended by the `Indigenous Church’ — had been superceded. The time for armed action had arrived. In effect, and according, to this model, the creation of military organisation was to be the final phase of the long political work of `implantation’ amongst the population. Today, the Zapatista army, stemming from these `mass’ organisations, is only one of the Organisation’s structures; it is its visible part! The texts of the EZLN and Marcos’ declarations often refer to this question. The success of the Zapatista organisation is explained, to a great extent, by the political intelligence of its militants, who proved themselves during this long period of `implantation’.
The revolt in Chiapas can’t be separated from the general deterioration of the situation. At the beginning of the 90s the whole of Mexico was shaken by a succession of social movements. The integration of the local economy into the North American economic sphere accelerated transformations which had been going on for years: in particular, the industrialisation of agricultural production and, beneath that, the collapse of agricultural subsistence. The pauperisation of the small peasants increases and brings about revolts and powerful mobilisations. At the same time, the mass of young people have no access to land and can no longer find work in the towns. Is it necessary to recall that 60% of the population of Chiapas today are less than 20 years old? It’s them who are going to swell the ranks of the Organisation. “Today the Zapatista army is mainly composed of this mass of modern young marginals, speaking several languages and having an experience of waged work. Their make-up has little connection to the isolated Indian that one imagines.”
